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Introduction
Jay Sexton
Few concepts in diplomatic historiography have had the staying power of the binaries of realism and idealism. This has been the case particularly in the literature 
on the foreign policy of the early republic. This persistent 
framework has had such pull that even those seeking to 
escape its grasp have found it difficult to avoid engaging 
with the labels.
Frank Cogliano’s compelling and cogently argued 
Emperor of Liberty seeks to reframe rather than resolve the old 
idealist/realist binary. To be sure, Cogliano has much to say 
in response to the traditional argument that Jefferson was a 
starry-eyed idealist. “He was not a doctrinaire ideologue,” 
Cogliano contends (10). But the book’s principle objective is 
to avoid flattening Jefferson into either of these categories. 
Jefferson, Cogliano argues, was “an idealist when writing 
about the future but a realist when considering the world 
around him.” This argument takes issue with the very 
categories of idealist and realist and focuses instead on the 
interface between abstract ideas and the practical contexts 
in which Jefferson operated. The reader is presented with 
a Jefferson who held firm convictions and had consistent 
objectives (namely, agrarian expansion and the promotion 
of open commerce abroad) but used a wide variety of means 
to achieve them that were dependent upon circumstances. 
In seven deeply researched case studies, Cogliano examines 
how Jefferson sought to square means with ends, restraints 
with opportunities, and interests with ideals. 
The reviewers praise Emperor of Liberty, though each 
brings to the discussion distinctive views of the relationship 
between idealism and realism in Jefferson’s foreign policy. 
Jeffrey Malanson finds much to like in the book but wonders 
if ideology played a more decisive role in Jefferson’s 
embargo policy than Cogliano allows. Likewise, Shannon 
Duffy finds that the book convincingly explains how and 
why Jefferson could embark upon certain ventures, such as 
military action in Tripoli and the Louisiana Purchase, that 
appear on their face to violate his political principles. But 
she wonders how Jefferson’s preconceived ideas dictated —
indeed, distorted—his foreign policy. Eliga Gould’s review 
helpfully places Emperor of Liberty into historiographical 
context and points toward further ways in which ideology 
and realism can be seen as “two sides of the same coin.”
Another feature of Emperor of Liberty commented upon 
by the reviewers is its coverage. Rather than comprehensively 
examining Jefferson’s role in foreign policy, Cogliano 
structures the book through seven chapters that explore 
specific episodes in Jefferson’s career. One of the most 
interesting—and the one that will be the least familiar 
to non-specialists— is the first chapter, which focuses on 
Jefferson’s unsuccessful tenure as governor of Virginia (the 
lowlight of which was Jefferson falling from his horse while 
fleeing from a British advance on Monticello in 1781). This 
chapter is central to Cogliano’s argument in that it enables 
him to flesh out how early career experiences conditioned 
Jefferson’s views on the conduct of foreign policy and led 
this anti-statist republican to embrace strong executive 
leadership in moments of crisis. 
Two of the seven chapters in Emperor of Liberty focus 
on the conflict with Tripoli in the Mediterranean. Cogliano 
demonstrates here both the significance of economic 
objectives to Jefferson’s overseas agenda and how the 
Tripolitan War, far from being an irrelevant sideshow, lay 
at the center of Jefferson’s foreign policy, not least in how 
it showed his willingness to use force. Robert Allison 
applauds these chapters, noting that Cogliano’s close 
engagement with the primary evidence helps him to avoid 
the anachronism of recent works that interpret the Barbary 
conflicts through the prism of U.S. interventions in the 
Middle East.
Cogliano picks up on the issue of anachronism in his 
response. He acknowledges that all books, his included, 
are products of the time in which they are written, before 
making the case for the need to avoid the trap of presentism. 
He also points out that he lived and worked outside the 
United States at a time when many American commenters 
and statesmen were going to great lengths to present their 
nation’s policies in ideological terms. Their work led many 
foreign observers to conclude rather simplistically that U.S. 
policy is the straightforward product of an exceptionalist, 
missionary ideology.
Cogliano shows how Jefferson’s foreign policy 
portended and paved the way toward the global power 
established by his successors. “It might be said that 
Jefferson’s vision for a capacious American empire outlived 
its author,” he writes (246). Yet in this superb book he 
repeatedly (and rightly) stresses the limits of U.S. power in 
the early republic, thus avoiding the anachronism inherent 
in so much of the scholarship on the United States in the 
nineteenth century. Jefferson’s “empire,” Cogliano notes, 
remained “a weak state on the periphery of the Atlantic 
world” (203). Indeed, he refers to Jefferson as “the father of 
the first American empire,” a qualification that illustrates 
the need to highlight the specific contexts of the United 
States in the world circa 1800, even as the historian looks 
toward the longue durée of rising U.S. power (6).
Between Is and Ought
Eliga H. Gould
Emperor of Liberty, Frank Cogliano’s new book about Thomas Jefferson’s foreign policy, opens with the story of a plaster bust of Tsar Alexander I that the president 
A Roundtable on 
Francis D. Cogliano, 
Emperor of Liberty:  
Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy
Jay Sexton, Eliga H. Gould, Shannon E. Duffy, Robert J. Allison, Jeffrey J. Malanson,  
and Francis D. Cogliano
Page 8   Passport January 2015
received in 1804 from Levett Harris, the American consul 
at St. Petersburg. Although Jefferson usually did not accept 
such gifts, the likeness became one of his most treasured 
possessions and eventually found a home opposite a 
similar statue of Napoleon in the parlor at Monticello. To 
visitors, the sight of the European autocrats must have 
seemed odd. Jefferson, after all, was the popularly elected 
head of an “empire of liberty,” not a hereditary monarch or 
a self-appointed dictator. Then, as now, people associated 
him with the ideals of democratic republicanism. Yet in 
his approach to foreign policy, Jefferson was at heart a 
pragmatist. In this, writes Cogliano, he was “not unlike his 
contemporaries Napoleon and Alexander” (10).
As Cogliano notes, this is a contentious argument. Fans 
and detractors alike usually see Jefferson as an idealist and 
view his handling of foreign policy accordingly. In their 
influential 1990 study Empire of Liberty, Robert W. Tucker 
and David C. Hendrickson argue that the animating goal of 
Jefferson’s statecraft was to create a “new diplomacy” that 
eschewed traditional strategies based on war and balance-
of-power politics and valorized peaceful negotiation and 
the recognition of universal rights. During the Louisiana 
Purchase, which doubled the territorial size of the United 
States without shedding a drop of American blood, the 
strategy appeared to work. (There was bloodshed, of 
course, but the blood that was shed belonged to the former 
slaves of Saint Domingue/Haiti and the hapless soldiers 
that Napoleon sent to subdue them.) On the other hand, 
during the maritime crisis with Britain, 
when Jefferson naïvely antagonized 
the world’s leading naval power, the 
strategy decimated the nation’s shipping 
and manufacturing sectors and brought 
the Union to the brink of collapse. 
Though sometimes the beneficiary 
of others’ realpolitik calculations, 
Jefferson thought (and acted) like a 
moral “crusader.”1  
According to Cogliano, such claims 
miss the mark. Taking particular aim 
at Tucker and Hendrickson—the co-
authors are mentioned in four different 
places in the text—he maintains that what their book depicts 
as naïve idealism in fact partook of a good measure of hard-
headed realism. In the case of the Louisiana negotiations, 
Cogliano writes that Jefferson knew, and was sure that the 
French and Spanish knew as well, that American forces 
would have little difficulty taking New Orleans, should a 
military operation prove necessary. Although he preferred 
to gain the colony through diplomacy, force was an option 
too. Force was also an option during the long conflict with 
Britain over maritime rights. Cogliano is under no illusions 
about the disastrous effects of Jefferson’s embargo on the 
American economy, and he concedes that the United States 
was fortunate to emerge unscathed from the War of 1812. 
“The embargo was flawed by design,” he says (241). Rather 
than seeing those shortcomings as the product of moralistic 
naïveté, however, Cogliano argues that the Union’s 
weakness and the difficulties that Americans would face 
in an open war with Britain meant that Jefferson had no 
alternative. He also maintains that Jefferson was well aware 
that the resort to economic warfare might lead to a shooting 
war. In late 1807 and 1808, writes Cogliano, “Jefferson had 
relatively few options available to him. He chose economic 
coercion, preparatory to war, as . . . the least bad” (240).
All in all, I find myself in broad sympathy with 
Cogliano’s argument. As the early chapters of his book 
show, Jefferson’s pragmatic foreign policy had deep roots. 
Three setbacks from his early career loomed especially 
large in this respect: his ineffective (and politically 
embarrassing) response to the British invasions of Virginia 
between 1779 and 1781; his failed attempt as U.S. minister 
to France to form a coalition of lesser powers against the 
depredations of the Barbary pirates; and his inability as 
secretary of state to contain the French Republic’s free-
lancing emissary, Edmond-Charles Genêt. All three left 
him with an appreciation of the need to combine the high-
minded pursuit of republican ideals in matters of domestic 
governance— where Cogliano concedes that Jefferson was 
an idealist—with hard-headed pragmatism in relations 
with other governments. According to Cogliano, one of the 
clearest signs of Jefferson’s thinking was the Tripolitan War 
of 1801–1805, which he launched to protect American trade 
and with it the national interest in a rather narrow, realpolitik 
sense. By attacking Tripoli, Jefferson also demonstrated a 
willingness to use armed force rather than engage in the 
nonviolent (albeit craven) practice of buying the liberty 
of American seamen by paying off their North African 
captors. Chastising the Barbary states was many things, but 
peaceful it was not.
If Cogliano is right to insist on the pragmatism of 
Jefferson’s foreign policy, as I am persuaded he is, there are 
some questions that I would like to hear more about. One in 
particular is whether Jefferson’s foreign policy was quite as 
non-ideological as his critique of Tucker and Hendrickson 
makes it appear. Insofar as the question involves what 
motivated Jefferson to act, Cogliano has already said as much 
as he needs to. Even during the embargo, which practically 
everyone agrees was a failure, Jefferson maintained a clear 
sense of the national interest, and he was prepared to use a 
variety of means, including brute force 
and old-fashioned power politics, to 
protect it. Yet in order to be historically 
significant, moral principles do not 
necessarily have to be used as guides 
for political action or to be matters of 
firm conviction or ardent belief. Just as 
often, ideals serve as rhetorical screens 
and weapons to justify policies that may 
or may not have an ideological origin. If 
we think of moral principles in this way, 
it seems to me that there were times 
when Jefferson did play the role of the 
idealist, albeit in ways that were both 
calculating and nationally self-interested.  
The strategy that Jefferson followed during the maritime 
crisis with Britain is instructive.  By objecting to Britain’s 
encroachments on American trade and extolling the virtues 
of an international order based on respect for the rule of law 
and the recognition of universal rights, especially neutral 
rights in times of war,  Jefferson employed a strategy first 
developed by Europe’s lesser maritime powers.  That group 
included the Russia of Alexander I, as well as Denmark, 
Prussia, and the Dutch Republic.  Although the rulers and 
governments that called for a new maritime diplomacy may 
have done so from moral conviction—Diderot famously 
included free trade in his vision of a “universal society”—
they were just as clearly looking for realpolitik ways to 
protect their own interests without risking a naval war that 
they would probably lose. The most celebrated example, 
one with which Jefferson and his American contemporaries 
were familiar, was the League of Armed Neutrality that 
Catherine the Great formed in 1780 to protect the merchant 
shipping fleets of the Baltic powers from British warships.2 
Though undeniably idealistic and derided in some circles as 
an “armed nullity,” the league was also the product of clear-
eyed political calculation. In both guises, it contributed to 
Britain’s growing diplomatic isolation during the final years 
of the War of American Independence, and it ultimately 
played an indirect role in the decision in 1782 to sue for 
peace.3 Twenty-five years later, Jefferson hoped for a similar 
outcome from his ill-fated boycott. Rather than standing at 
opposite ends of a moral spectrum, realism and idealism 
were two sides of the same coin.
Yet in order to be historically 
significant, moral principles do 
not necessarily have to be used 
as guides for political action or 
to be matters of firm conviction 
or ardent belief. Just as often, 
ideals serve as rhetorical screens 
and weapons to justify policies 
that may or may not have an 
ideological origin.
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In Emperor of Liberty, Frank Cogliano makes a persuasive 
case for the pragmatic underpinnings of Jefferson’s foreign 
policy. The diplomat that emerges is both flexible and 
realistic. To say that this flexibility and realism included 
the ability to invoke the ideals of the new diplomacy 
without becoming a prisoner of those same ideals does not, 
I think, detract from either the man or this latest account 
of his accomplishments. Emperor of Liberty is an important 
book that diplomatic and political historians of the early 
American republic will need to address.
Notes:
1.  Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: 
The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford and New York, 1990), 256.
2. For the league’s impact on American thinking about foreign 
policy, see Peter S. Onuf and Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Federal 
Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 
1776–1814 (Madison, 1993), 97, 202, 205–6.
3. Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and Ameri-
can Independence (New York, 1965), 165–8.
The Pragmatic Philosophe? Review of Francis D. 
Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s 
Foreign Policy
Shannon E. Duffy
In Emperor of Liberty, Francis Cogliano—who has written a work on Thomas Jefferson’s relationship to historical memory and edited a collection of Jefferson’s writings—
aims to show the basic consistency in Jefferson’s thought 
about foreign policy and to rescue him from charges of being 
a starry-eyed idealist. The book is based on the author’s 
extensive and deep knowledge of Jefferson’s writings, as 
well as a thorough grounding in the recent historiography 
of events of the period. In contrast to historians who depict 
Jefferson as overly naïve and idealistic, Cogliano portrays 
him as a pragmatic realist who consistently approached 
foreign policy with a flexible, hardheaded recognition of 
the realm of the possible. Jefferson was “an idealist when 
writing about the future but a realist when considering 
the world around him” (10). For Cogliano, this realism was 
reflected in two key aspects of Jefferson’s performance 
in office: his accurate recognition of America’s military 
weakness on the world stage and his use of creative 
methods to attempt to compensate for it.
Cogliano builds his case for Jefferson as a pragmatic 
realist by systematically examining seven specific episodes 
in Jefferson’s life, ranging from his time as governor of 
Virginia through his tenure as foreign minister, secretary 
of state, and finally, president. By starting with Jefferson’s 
governorship of 1779–81, rather than in the 1780s or 1790s, 
Cogliano aims to show a fundamental consistency in 
Jefferson’s thought and action. Historians generally pay 
little attention to Jefferson’s governorship, aside from noting 
that it was not his finest hour, as the most notable event 
in it was Jefferson’s rather frantic flight from the British, 
“scampering” away into seclusion after his capital was 
taken.1 Cogliano, however, stresses the serious constraints 
on Jefferson’s action at the time, including the weak 
executive office he held as well as Virginia’s general lack 
of military preparedness. While governor, Jefferson exerted 
executive authority beyond the stated limits of the office 
on several occasions during the invasion, trusting that his 
actions would be approved by his legislature retroactively. 
His wartime governorship taught him a basic (and very 
Roman) lesson: that the executive was morally justified 
in exercising an extraordinary amount of power in grave 
emergencies; but in order not to slide into despotism, he 
had subsequently to submit his actions to the judgment of 
his legislature. This lesson played a crucial role in shaping 
Jefferson’s future behavior as a political leader, especially in 
the realm of foreign affairs, teaching him the need for quick 
and decisive action and a certain flexibility in constitutional 
principles. 
Jefferson’s greatest priority throughout his public 
career was the preservation and expansion of his agrarian 
republic—through the protection of free trade. He may 
have envisioned America as an agricultural nation, but 
he did not see it as a pre-capitalist utopia. Overseas trade 
was a key component of his ideal. By exporting their 
agricultural surplus to foreign markets, Americans could 
continue to enjoy manufactures without having to undergo 
industrialization themselves, thus staving off the corruption 
that Jefferson believed inevitably followed a nation’s turn 
to manufacturing. The twin goals of promoting expansion 
and protecting the trade that would make agriculture 
economically viable guided Jefferson throughout his career.
Cogliano’s text also explains another seeming 
inconsistency in Jefferson’s thought: his readiness to resort 
to military action against the Barbary nations of North 
Africa, as opposed to his apparently deep resistance to go to 
war with either Britain or France. The latter led to his most 
controversial decision, the Embargo of 1807. While Jefferson 
believed (erroneously) that the Barbary nations would be 
easily crushed, and he entertained the possibility of war 
with Spain over Florida, he strenuously resisted engaging 
the United States in war with either Britain or France 
because of the danger such a war would pose to the fragile 
republic. His alternative methods of dealing with French 
and British insults were, in essence, stalling mechanisms 
designed to give the United States time to better prepare 
for military conflict. 
Cogliano convincingly explains how neither 
Jefferson’s military action against Tripoli at the start of his 
administration nor the Louisiana Purchase violated his 
constitutional principles, as some historians have claimed. 
With regard to the Tripolitan War, Jefferson began military 
action without congressional approval because a state of 
war already existed (Tripoli being the one to declare war 
on the United States); he then went to Congress to seek 
approval of his actions. He followed the same procedure 
in the Louisiana Purchase, taking decisive action in a time-
sensitive crisis but then obtaining retroactive legislative 
approval. While Jefferson had not instigated the Louisiana 
Purchase, his excellent sense of timing and adroit diplomacy 
ensured that the surprise opportunity to purchase the land 
was not wasted, leading to the greatest triumph of his 
presidency. 
Cogliano makes a strong case that Jefferson as a 
public leader responded to events pragmatically and 
flexibly rather than as a stiff-backed ideologue hopelessly 
constrained by his principles. However, his own text shows 
a certain Aristotelian pattern in Jefferson’s underlying 
beliefs. Jefferson’s day-to-day actions might have been 
motivated by practical considerations, but his fundamental 
understandings of the problems that confronted him 
throughout his life seemed to be based mainly in his 
ideology and abstract ideals.
For example, it is well known that Jefferson centered 
his dreams for America’s future around a nation of yeoman 
farmers who would be able to maintain their virtue longer 
because they were financially independent and did not 
have to rely on the whims of a patron or employer.  This 
ideal is at the core of Jefferson’s vision for the country, 
the prize that all Jefferson’s actions were geared toward 
preserving. What should be noted as well, however, is 
that Jefferson’s elevation of the virtues of agrarianism 
can go well beyond typical contemporary criticism of 
manufacturing societies, into the realm of the mystical. His 
attitude is clear in such statements as “Those who labour 
in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a 
chosen people. . . . It is the focus in which he keeps alive that 
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sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of 
the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is 
a phænomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished 
an example” (46). Jefferson’s methods for sustaining an 
agrarian republic might be practical and pragmatic, but 
his reasons for wanting that agrarian republic ultimately 
seem to be emotional and irrational. That farmers were an 
inherently better, more moral people than manufacturers 
seems to be a basic, unquestioned premise derived not 
from life experience but from Jefferson’s philosophy. 
What is most striking throughout Cogliano’s text, 
in fact, is the number of times that Cogliano proves that 
Jefferson acted pragmatically and decisively but at the 
same time failed in his actions because his basic assessment 
of the situation, which was derived from his tendency to 
arrive at premises beforehand, was in error. In the case 
of the Barbary conflict, Jefferson decided from the outset, 
while serving as foreign minister in the 1780s, that paying 
tribute was not an option. His ultimate reasoning does 
seem to be moralistic in nature: giving tribute to “pyratical 
states” was morally wrong. Jefferson saw it as a betrayal 
of American virtue to behave like the corrupted nations 
of Europe and submit to blackmail. He responded to the 
Barbary threat first by proposing an overly optimistic 
scheme to enlist other nations in a joint military venture 
(which never materialized) and then, as president, with 
overly rosy assessments of how much 
damage could be inflicted by U.S. 
military blockades. Jefferson’s efforts 
to embargo the Barbary states, even 
at their most intensive, were hardly 
an unqualified success, particularly 
given their cost, and ultimately 
resulted in at most a significant 
discount on the ransom eventually 
paid for America’s sailors.2
Jefferson’s thought also seems to 
reveal a certain cold-blooded element 
at several points in his career, as when 
he chided U.S. diplomats for making 
personal funds available to the 
Barbary captives and thus revealing 
American concern for their well-being 
to their captors, or when he dismissed 
the murder victims of the French 
Revolution (some of whom Jefferson 
had known personally) as unfortunate casualties of the fight 
for liberty. His rather famous (or infamous) “Adam and Eve” 
quote concerning the Parisian prison massacres of 1792 is a 
classic case in point: “My own affections have been deeply 
wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather 
than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth 
desolated. [W]ere there but an Adam and Eve left in every 
country, and left free, it would be better than as it now is” 
(96). Cogliano suggests that the extremity of this quotation 
shows the extent to which the French Revolution polarized 
American opinion. To me it also suggests something rather 
disturbing about Mr. Jefferson. Violence in fact often seems 
an abstract concept to him. While his fellow diplomat in 
France, the more conservatively minded Gouverneur 
Morris, was undoubtedly less inclined to admire the French 
revolutionary republic to begin with, Morris’s experience of 
being caught up in a revolutionary mob in 1792, complete 
with heads on pikes, doubtless brought home to him the 
dangers of violent revolution in a visceral way. That was an 
experience his Republican colleague never had.3
Jefferson’s gift for misreading underlying causation 
and his blithe dismissal of others’ pain as necessary for the 
good of the republic both played key roles in the episode 
that Cogliano himself acknowledges was a debacle: the 
Embargo of 1807. Once again, there were several key 
misconceptions at the heart of Jefferson’s policy. By 
forbidding all export of American provisions, Jefferson 
hoped to starve both France and Britain into submission and 
force both governments to drop their restrictions on neutral 
trade. He failed to recognize, however, that both empires 
had other possible sources for raw materials. Jefferson also 
completely underestimated Britain’s level of fear in the face 
of Napoleonic France, attributing British motives to a desire 
to squash the neutral shipping of the United States rather 
than true military desperation.4 Once popular resistance to 
the embargo began growing, Jefferson tended to attribute 
this resistance to declining virtue among his countrymen 
rather than the genuine economic pain caused by the 
embargo.
Cogliano defends the embargo by claiming that 
Jefferson had few other options. He maintains that Jefferson 
ultimately expected war; the embargo was a stalling 
mechanism designed to allow the United States time to get 
ready while preventing more British and French insults and 
attacks. The fifteen-month-long embargo ultimately had 
little to no effect on British and French trade, but it wreaked 
havoc on the American economy. U.S. exports fell from 
over a hundred million dollars in 1807 to around twenty 
million in 1808 (238). Jefferson’s failure lay not merely in his 
initial conception of the embargo, but also in his stubborn 
refusal to acknowledge its failure over the next two years. 
Cogliano details the economic and diplomatic aspects of 
this failure but puts less stress on its 
long-term political effects within the 
United States. 
It is unclear if Jefferson ever 
realized the extent of the damage 
his embargo did. It exacerbated 
regional tensions—precisely the 
danger Jefferson tried throughout 
his entire presidency to avoid—and 
created lasting ill will towards the 
Republican-led federal government 
that would haunt his successor’s 
administration. Ironically, for 
a president long opposed to a 
powerful centralized government, 
enforcement of the embargo required 
a governmental power that in many 
ways was more intrusive than any 
customs decree passed by the British 
during the colonial period. American 
ports were effectively closed by their country’s own navy, 
and federal port authorities were allowed to seize the cargos 
of ships suspected of violating the act. Northeasterners, 
whose economies were especially hard hit, came to feel 
that the federal government was willing to use despotic 
measures against its own citizens and was unconcerned 
with their well-being. The Embargo of 1807 did keep the 
United States at peace for another five years, giving the 
country more time to prepare militarily. At the same time, 
it created such serious tensions within the nation that by 
1812, President Madison was leading a profoundly divided 
people into war.
That Jefferson never seems to have recognized the 
extent of his mistake, attributing the embargo’s failure 
to declining American virtue instead of recognizing, as 
Cogliano points out, that he as president had failed to “sell” 
the plan, seems to me to be one of the strongest examples 
of that ideological stubbornness that too often lurked at 
the core of Jefferson’s thinking. There have been times, in 
fact, when I have wondered if Benjamin Franklin’s famous 
description of John Adams—that he was “always an honest 
man, often a wise one, but sometimes and in some things, 
absolutely out of his senses”— could have been more aptly 
applied to Adams’s colleague and rival, Thomas Jefferson. 
It is unclear if Jefferson ever realized 
the extent of the damage his embargo 
did. It exacerbated regional tensions—
precisely the danger Jefferson tried 
throughout his entire presidency to 
avoid—and created lasting ill will 
towards the Republican-led federal 
government that would haunt his 
successor’s administration. Ironically, 
for a president long opposed to a 
powerful centralized government, 
enforcement of the embargo required 
a governmental power that in many 
ways was more intrusive than any 
customs decree passed by the British 
during the colonial period. 
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Notes:
1. Betsy Ambler to Mildred Smith [June 1781], “An Old Virginia 
Correspondence,” Atlantic Monthly 84 (July, 1899): 537–39, quoted 
on page 26 of Emperor of Liberty.
2. The correspondence of Commodore Edward Preble, who was 
in charge of the blockade during the part of the Tripolitan War, 
provides a detailed depiction of the geographical, military, and 
political difficulties inherent in trying to defeat the North Af-
ricans through blockade: “Edward Preble (1761–1807) Papers, 
1680–1912,” Library of Congress manuscripts, Washington, DC, 
volumes 5–14 (1803–1805).
3. Philippe Ziesche, Cosmopolitan Patriots: Americans in Paris in the 
Age of Revolution (Charlottesville, VA, 2010), 50–54.
4. Jefferson was still maintaining that this was Britain’s true goal 
in 1810: “At length Gr. Br. has been forced to pull off her mask and 
shew that her real object is the exclusive use of the ocean.” Jef-
ferson to Madison, June 27, 1810, in The Republic of Letters: The Cor-
respondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776–1826, 
ed. James Morton Smith (New York, 1995), 3: 1638. 
Jefferson and Barbary
Robert J. Allison
Jefferson scholars, according to Francis Cogliano, have given too little attention to the Tripolitan War. Dumas 
Malone devotes five pages to the war in his six-volume 
biography; a dozen of Henry Adams’s 437 pages on 
Jefferson’s first term concern Tripoli; Robert Tucker and 
David Hendrickson’s book on Jefferson’s statecraft limits 
its discussion of the Tripolitan War to a footnote—though 
a five-page footnote. Cogliano devotes two of his seven 
chapters to Jefferson’s engagement with the Barbary states 
and shows how this engagement was central to Jefferson’s 
overall strategic vision for the American republic. 
Jefferson had a clear ideological vision but was 
pragmatic about how to attain it. This is Cogliano’s main 
theme—not that Jefferson was an idealistic ideologue or a 
philosophical visionary, but that his goals for the American 
republic were rooted in the practical. Jefferson’s interest 
in the Mediterranean was economic, not ideological. The 
Mediterranean trade was worth $10 million each year;  by 
threatening that trade, Algiers presented an existential 
threat to the American republic (170–71). 
In his Report on the Mediterranean Trade (1790), Secretary 
of State Jefferson calculated the value of American trade 
to the Mediterranean: one-sixth of the wheat and flour 
produced in the United States and one-quarter of the 
cod caught off the New England coast were sold in the 
Mediterranean. The cod trade alone employed 1200 men, 
on 80 to 100 boats. Algerian attacks on American merchant 
ships limited this trade; resolving the problem of Algiers 
could double it.  
“We ought to begin a naval power, if we mean to carry 
on our own commerce,” Jefferson wrote to James Monroe 
in November 1784. The Barbary states threatened American 
trade, and without outlets for American agricultural goods 
the republican experiment would fail. “Can we begin it 
on a more honourable occasion or with a weaker foe” (51)? 
American commerce was essential to American agricultural 
production; a navy would be essential to protecting the 
trade in American grain and fish.  
In the spring of 1785 Congress charged Jefferson 
and John Adams, the minister to London, with resolving 
the problem posed by the Barbary states and authorized 
them to spend up to $80,000 for treaties. Algiers was 
threatening, and Morocco, which had recognized American 
independence in 1778, had grown tired of waiting for an 
American negotiator to make a treaty and had seized an 
American ship to get the United States’ attention. 
Morocco was easy. Thomas Barclay, an experienced 
merchant and diplomat, took six months to reach 
Marrakech, but four days after he arrived he and Emperor 
Sidi Muhammad made a treaty. It cost $20,000, but there 
would be no annual tribute. “Send your ships and trade 
with us,” the emperor said, “and I will do everything you 
can desire” (54). 
Algiers would be more difficult.  Before Jefferson 
could send a negotiator, Algiers captured two ships and 
took twenty-one hostages. With no experienced agent at 
hand, Jefferson thought Congress meant him to send John 
Lamb, a Connecticut mule trader who carried Congress’s 
dispatches to Paris.  “He has followed for many years the 
Barbary trade,” Jefferson told Adams, “and seems intimately 
acquainted with those states.” Although Lamb also brought 
a reference from Connecticut’s governor, Jefferson had “not 
seen enough of him to judge of his abilities” (55). 
Lamb’s abilities included neither haste nor discretion. 
After “maney little disappointments” in the seven months 
he took to trek from Paris to Algiers, Lamb clashed with 
everyone—American hostages, Spanish and French 
consuls, Algerian officials—except England’s consul, who 
had been humiliatingly abusive to the American prisoners. 
Richard O’Brien, the captain of a captured vessel who had 
emerged as the leader and spokesman for the American 
hostages (and later would be American consul-general 
in Algiers) “could hardly believe Congress would [have] 
sent such a man to negociate so important an affair as the 
making a peace with the Algerines where it required the 
most able Statesman and Politician” (58).  But not even the 
most able statesman or politician could have made peace on 
the terms Lamb was authorized to offer: $4,200 to ransom 
the 21 hostages. Muhammad V ben Othman, the dey of 
Algeria, demanded nearly $60,000. Lamb left Algiers. A 
year later another correspondent reported to Jefferson that 
Lamb was “about to embark from Minorca with a load of 
Jack-asses for America. Sic transit Gloria mundi.”1
Tripolitan envoy Abdurrahman’s arrival in London 
raised Adams’s hopes, and he urged Jefferson to London. 
“There is nothing to be done in Europe, of half the Importance 
of this, and I dare not communicate to Congress what has 
passed without your concurrence” (63). Abdurrahman 
could arrange peace with Tripoli for £30,000, and with all 
the Barbary states for £200,000. Of Abdurrahman Adams 
said, “This man is either a consummate politician in art 
and address, or he is a benevolent and wise man. Time will 
discover whether he disguises an interested character, or is 
indeed the philosopher he pretends to be” (63).
Jefferson was not very impressed. The cost of peace 
would be far beyond what Congress was willing to pay. He 
and Adams had “honestly and zealously” set out to buy a 
peace, as Congress directed, but Jefferson had “very early 
thought it would be best to effect a peace thro’ the medium 
of war” (66). He estimated that it would cost £450,000 to 
build and man a fleet and £45,000 a year to maintain it. It 
would be more expensive than buying peace, but Jefferson 
believed that other nations would contribute funds: 
Portugal, Denmark, Rome, Venice, Sweden, the German 
states, and ports in Malta and Naples. He met with the 
consuls and ministers from the potential allies, proposing a 
“Convention Against the Barbary States.” To bolster support 
in America, he had the Marquis de Lafayette propose it as 
his own idea to George Washington and Foreign Minister 
John Jay. Jay submitted it to Congress, where it slowly but 
quietly died. 
Jefferson’s Barbary Convention, Cogliano says, came 
out of his recognition of American weakness. He sought 
to use the country’s limited power in collaboration with 
other nations. Together they could blockade the Barbary 
corsairs and force them individually to treaties. “I am of the 
opinion [John] Paul Jones with half a dozen frigates would 
totally destroy their commerce,” he wrote to Monroe, “not 
by attempting bombardments as the Mediterranean states 
do . . . but by constant cruising and cutting them to peices 
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[sic]” (51). 
Though his Barbary Convention came to naught, 
Jefferson held onto the idea of sending John Paul Jones to 
Algiers. When Congress opted to purchase peace rather 
than use military force in 1791, Secretary of State Jefferson 
commissioned Jones to be the American negotiator in 
Algiers. Jefferson did not expect a purchased peace to last, 
so he told Jones to study Algiers’s defenses as “we look 
forward to the necessity of coercion.”2 
Unfortunately for Jefferson’s strategy, Jones died before 
receiving those instructions, and years passed before the 
United States sent an agent to Algiers again. Meanwhile, 
Algiers resumed its attacks, and by the end of 1793 more 
than a hundred American sailors languished in captivity 
there. Jefferson now was in retirement in Monticello, and 
though his political allies opposed the move, the United 
States began to build a navy to fight Algiers. However, 
peace was purchased before the frigates were launched. 
The Barbary treaties cost the United States $1.25 million 
(about 20 percent of the federal budget) and required 
annual tribute in the form of naval supplies, including 
ships and weapons. President Washington thought this 
“disagreeable” but saw no alternative “but to comply, or 
submit to the depredations of the Barbary Corsairs ” (149).
Congress was not happy with the treaties, and by 1800 
neither was Yusuf Karamanli, the pacha of Tripoli. The 
American tribute was always late, and the treaty treated 
Tripoli as an Algerian satellite. In October 1800 Karamanli 
gave the American consul six months to deliver $250,000 plus 
$20,000 in annual tribute. This demand reached the United 
States just as Jefferson was assuming the presidency. On 
May 15, his cabinet discussed Tripoli’s threats to American 
commerce and unanimously agreed that the executive 
must protect American interests. Jefferson dispatched three 
frigates and a schooner to the Mediterranean to observe, to 
protect American commerce, and, if necessary, to blockade 
any states that declared war, if possible in collaboration with 
other powers. When Congress reconvened in December he 
would inform it of these developments. The cabinet did not 
know that on the previous day—May 14, 1801—Tripoli had 
declared war by cutting down the flagpole in front of the 
American consulate.  
Jefferson would try to fight the Tripolitan War without 
expanding the federal budget. By 1803 this strategy’s flaws 
were obvious. Three or four ships could not both blockade 
Tripoli and cruise the Mediterranean protecting American 
commerce. When one of the American frigates ran aground 
off Tripoli in October 1803, the war went from ineffective to 
disastrous.  
Jefferson responded to this disaster—the loss of the 
second-largest ship and the taking of 300 prisoners—by 
sending six more frigates, five schooners, and a brig to the 
Mediterranean. Congress authorized a “Mediterranean 
Fund,” created with an additional 2½ percent tariff to pay 
for the expanded war and build more ships. From William 
Eaton, the American consul in Tunis, the administration 
learned that the Tripolitans were “very discontented and ripe 
for revolt; they want nothing but confidence in the prospect 
of our success” (166). The administration authorized Eaton’s 
plan to ally with Yusuf Karamanli’s deposed brother Hamet 
and lead a force into Libya rallying the Tripolitan people 
to cast off Yusuf in favor of his brother. But Jefferson also 
gave the naval commanders discretion in their support for 
Eaton’s venture, making it clear that American policy was 
to free American trade in the Mediterranean, not establish 
Hamet Karamanli in power in Tripoli. Eaton and Hamet 
Karamanli captured the city of Derna in April 1805, but the 
Tripolitan people failed to rise up for Hamet, and the naval 
officers negotiated a treaty with Yusuf that was favorable to 
American trade.  
A deeply embittered Eaton recalled that Attorney 
General Levi Lincoln, before the venture to Libya, “amused 
me with predictions of a political millennium which was 
about to happen in the United States. The millennium was 
to usher in upon us as the irresistible consequence of the 
goodness of heart, integrity of mind, and correctness of 
disposition of Mr. Jefferson. All nations, even pirates and 
savages, were to be moved by the influence of his persuasive 
virtue and masterly skill in diplomacy.”3
Jefferson’s policy in the Mediterranean was not to 
secure a political millennium, but to secure American 
trade. The policy was consistent with his overall strategic 
vision for the United States, as Cogliano makes clear in this 
study. The Tripolitan War was not a minor distraction; it 
was the major chord in Jeffersonian diplomacy. It was not 
an inconsistent use of force by a pacific chief executive, nor 
a stretching of constitutional strictures. Jefferson in the 
1780s had advocated military force in the Mediterranean—a 
multinational alliance if possible, but a lone American 
venture if necessary. American commerce was the essential 
instrument for developing the American republic, and 
a navy would be required to protect trade in the world’s 
oceans. Cogliano takes notice of the Jefferson books that 
have downplayed Tripoli; he also takes notice of the books 
written since 2001 that try to show Tripoli as a precursor 
to more recent engagements with the Middle East. All are 
anachronistic. Cogliano takes Jefferson on his own terms 
and by focusing on the primary documents recovers the 
world as Jefferson and his contemporaries understood it.  
Notes:
1. Robert Allison, The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the 
Muslim World (Chicago, 2000), 16.
2. Allison, Crescent Obscured, 18. 
3. Henry Adams, History of the United States of America During the 
First Administration of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1891), 2: 431.  
Pragmatism vs. Idealism in Jeffersonian Statecraft: A 
Review of Francis D. Cogliano’s Emperor of Liberty: 
Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy
Jeffrey J. Malanson 
The standard historical narrative presents Thomas Jefferson as the primary example of idealism in action in early American foreign policy. Rather than 
being a realist of the George Washington school, Jefferson 
believed in a set of principles (chief among them were free 
trade, western expansion, and the sanctity of American 
rights), and his desire to see those principles unwaveringly 
defended shaped his foreign policy, regardless of on-the-
ground realities or other practical considerations. 
Francis D. Cogliano skillfully and persuasively 
challenges this narrative in Emperor of Liberty: Thomas 
Jefferson’s Foreign Policy. At the heart of his investigation is 
an effort to confront the realist-idealist dichotomy: he argues 
that while “Jefferson proclaimed himself an idealist,” he 
was not a “doctrinaire ideologue” when it came to foreign 
policy (9–10). Cogliano frames Jefferson’s understanding of 
America’s republican empire as being “premised on access 
to plentiful land and overseas trade,” and he contends that 
the strength of this republican vision and its centrality to 
Jefferson’s statecraft renders any realist-idealist assessment 
somewhat useless (5). He asserts that “Jefferson was an 
idealist when writing about the future but a realist when 
considering the world around him. . . .  [A]lthough Jefferson 
was guided by a clear ideological vision for the American 
republic, he was pragmatic about the means he employed 
to protect the republic and advance its strategic interests.” 
To phrase this slightly differently, “Jefferson’s ends were 
consistent, yet he was flexible about the means he employed 
to achieve them” (10). Jefferson as pragmatist within a 
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larger idealist context is a new spin on the third president. 
The force of Cogliano’s argument and evidence encourages 
serious engagement with and an honest reassessment of the 
concept of Jeffersonian idealism.
It appears that an early version of this project would 
have focused primarily on Jefferson’s presidency as the 
time when he could most directly shape the direction of 
U.S. foreign policy, but Cogliano wisely (I would argue) 
broadened that focus to investigate a series of different 
episodes stretching across forty years of Jefferson’s 
public career. “We can understand Jefferson’s actions as 
president,” Cogliano explains, “only if we appreciate how 
he came to understand power and international relations 
throughout his career as an office-holder: as governor 
of Virginia, minister to France, and as secretary of state, 
vice president, and president of the United States.” This 
longer-term, episodic analysis serves to more completely 
“illuminate [Jefferson’s] understanding of America’s place 
in the world” (7). In seven chapters Cogliano examines 
Jefferson’s conduct as governor during Great Britain’s 
1780–81 invasion of Virginia; negotiations with the Barbary 
states while he was stationed in France; his handling while 
secretary of state of the Nootka Sound crisis of 1790 and 
the French Revolution; his near powerlessness as vice 
president during the “Quasi-War” with France and his 
more aggressive response to the Alien and Sedition Acts; 
and finally, his presidential statecraft during the Tripolitan 
War, the Louisiana Purchase, the impressment crisis, the 
Monroe-Pinkney Treaty negotiations, and the embargo of 
1807.
While much of this list represents the necessary 
“greatest hits” of Jefferson’s foreign policy, the first three 
episodes in particular go a long 
way toward explaining the longer-
term trajectory of Jefferson’s 
views and illustrating Cogliano’s 
argument about pragmatic means 
and idealistic ends. The chapter 
on Jefferson’s term as governor 
demonstrates the development 
of Jefferson’s views on the role of 
the executive. These views might 
run counter to what many would 
expect of Jefferson, especially 
given his later concerns about the 
powers of the president under 
the new Constitution. The events 
that occurred while Jefferson was 
governor, including the British invasion, the inquiry into his 
conduct, and Virginia’s flirtation with giving the governor 
virtually dictatorial powers in times of crisis, fostered in 
him a belief, Cogliano concludes, that “an executive must 
act decisively in crisis. In so doing he might sometimes 
have to exceed constitutional limits, provided he did so for 
the public good and in the spirit of the constitution and, 
crucially, sought retrospective legislative approval for his 
actions” (34). Jefferson’s gubernatorial experience might 
not have had much to do with foreign policy, but it gives 
the reader the right perspective from which to approach the 
rest of the book.  
While minister to France from 1785 to 1789, Jefferson 
repeatedly pushed for the United States to build a navy and 
go to war against the Barbary states rather than relying on 
negotiation and annual tribute payments to preserve peace 
and safeguard American commerce. Jefferson’s contention 
that the United States should not have to play by the same 
rules as Europe in dealing with the Barbary states contains 
a stronger idealist streak than Cogliano would allow, but it 
is an example that suggests how messy these assessments 
of idealism versus realism actually are. So much depends 
on the angle from which the episode is viewed. The call 
for a naval buildup and for war represents a more martial 
version of Jefferson than we are accustomed to seeing.
Amongst all the events covered in Emperor of Liberty, 
I was especially glad to see Cogliano include the Nootka 
Sound crisis of 1790 as part of his analysis. Aside from 
the ongoing challenge posed by the Barbary states, the 
threat of an Anglo-Spanish war on the American frontier, 
along with the upheaval it might create in the balance of 
power in North America, was the first real foreign policy 
crisis faced by the United States under the Constitution. 
In the end the United States was not required to act, but 
the Washington administration’s responses to the crisis 
revealed a great deal about international diplomacy and the 
role of the United States in the world at a critical juncture in 
the country’s history. It was a formative experience for both 
Washington and Jefferson. Taken as a whole, these episodes 
contextualize Jefferson’s worldview before the United 
States had to confront the extreme challenges posed by the 
French Revolution and two decades of Anglo-French war.
Emperor of Liberty is full of surprises. The Thomas 
Jefferson writing at the end of his governorship about 
executive power and a Virginia citizenry perhaps not entirely 
suited for republican government reads like a Federalist 
statesman in the making rather than the future founder of 
the Democratic-Republican party. Jefferson’s flirtation with 
the overthrow of the government of Tripoli in 1804, while 
ultimately abandoned, foreshadowed a staple of America’s 
twentieth-century foreign policy. Cogliano also embraces 
Jefferson’s inconsistency in a way that is commendable. 
Jefferson has been criticized by some historians for his lack 
of consistency in many aspects of his life, but Cogliano 
views the inconsistency as a mark of Jefferson’s blend of 
pragmatism and idealism: “[Jefferson] was not concerned 
about consistency in his methods 
so much as expediency in achieving 
his ends” (93). 
Despite the complex image 
of Jefferson that Emperor of Liberty 
presents, this is a highly accessible 
book that will work extremely well 
in a wide variety of undergraduate 
classroom settings. Cogliano 
challenges our understanding 
of Jefferson and the differences 
between idealism and realism in 
U.S. foreign policy in ways that 
should yield thoughtful classroom 
discussions. The book also features 
one of the best summaries that I have 
read of Jefferson’s views on agrarian virtue, the corruptions 
of manufacturing, and the importance of commerce to the 
republican empire.
This is a book deserving of praise, but I do have to 
quibble with the subtitle—Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy—
as it is too limiting a description of Cogliano’s study. I 
think that the term Cogliano might have preferred to use 
is “statecraft,” as he cites the concept repeatedly when 
discussing Jefferson’s leadership and decision making. The 
opening chapter on Jefferson as governor of Virginia, the 
treatment of his response to the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
and even his handling of the Louisiana Purchase are not 
really concerned with foreign policy so much as Jefferson’s 
conception of the powers of the state (and states) and the 
contours of republican empire. This is not a criticism; rather 
it is a commentary on the strength of Cogliano’s vision of the 
elements of Jeffersonian statecraft, which exceeds the more 
narrow bounds of foreign policy. It is possible, of course, 
that Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson’s Empire 
of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (1990) made the 
use of “statecraft” impractical.
My main point of contention with Emperor of Liberty 
is that even though I found Cogliano’s argument to be 
important and thought-provoking, I was ultimately not 
Emperor of Liberty is full of surprises. The 
Thomas Jefferson writing at the end of his 
governorship about executive power and 
a Virginia citizenry perhaps not entirely 
suited for republican government reads like 
a Federalist statesman in the making rather 
than the future founder of the Democratic-
Republican party. Jefferson’s flirtation with 
the overthrow of the government of Tripoli 
in 1804, while ultimately abandoned, 
foreshadowed a staple of America’s 
twentieth-century foreign policy. 
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convinced by it in every case. There were greater elements 
of pragmatism in Jefferson’s worldview than I previously 
would have conceded, but I continue to believe that 
idealism played a larger role in determining Jefferson’s 
foreign policy than Cogliano contends. The specific point 
of departure here is Jefferson’s decision to reject the 1806 
Monroe-Pinkney Treaty with Great Britain.  Jefferson and his 
cabinet decided not to approve the treaty, which would have 
replaced the expired Jay Treaty and “won some significant 
concessions” from the British (224). They were troubled 
primarily by the treaty’s failure to address concretely the 
impressment of American seamen into service in the British 
navy. Cogliano asserts that Jefferson believed “that it was 
politically and ethically impossible to compromise over 
the impressment question” and that his refusal to submit 
the treaty to the United States Senate for ratification was a 
“means to continue the negotiations [with Britain], not close 
them off.” Cogliano concludes that “Jefferson’s response 
to the Monroe-Pinkney treaty was grounded in a realistic 
assessment of the situation, not excessive idealism” (226–
27). The ultimate result of the failed treaty negotiations was 
the embargo of 1807, which “historians often ascribe . . . 
to misguided Jeffersonian idealism.” Cogliano rejects this 
assessment, as “this interpretation assumed that Jefferson 
had a range of options available to him but was blinded 
by his idealism or moralism. On the contrary, Jefferson 
had relatively few options available 
to him. He chose economic coercion, 
preparatory to war, as, he believed, 
the least bad of these” (240). In this 
isolated instance, Jefferson did not 
have many options open to him, but 
that was because he had severely 
limited his options by having rejected 
the Monroe-Pinkney treaty earlier that 
year.
James Monroe and William 
Pinkney pragmatically negotiated the 
best treaty that they could, given both 
the constraints under which Britain 
operated (Cogliano describes Britain 
as being engaged in a “death struggle 
against Napoleon”) and the relative 
weakness of the United States (235). 
I would argue that the decision to 
reject the treaty because of impressment was not a decision 
grounded in pragmatism. Whether one wants to ascribe the 
rejection of the treaty to Jefferson’s idealism about American 
rights, his inability to assess realistically America’s weight 
in the world (a blind spot he frequently succumbed to 
throughout his life), or an impractical expectation that the 
British would give in to American demands in subsequent 
rounds of negotiation, the decision was not one based on 
a pragmatic assessment of likely outcomes. A dozen years 
earlier, the United States confronted a strikingly similar 
set of circumstances in its relations with Britain; the Jay 
Treaty preserved peace, secured important commercial 
concessions, but sacrificed larger principles on impressment 
and neutral trade. George Washington signed the treaty, 
believing that peace and commerce were more important 
for a weak United States than was taking a stand in defense 
of principles that could not be defended.  Jefferson faced 
the same basic decision, and acknowledged the same basic 
weakness, but was unwilling to sacrifice principles, even 
temporarily. He effectively backed himself into a corner 
where his options were limited and had to choose between 
destroying American commerce with an embargo (another 
decision in part premised on an overestimation of America’s 
weight in the world) or war.
Even if I was not fully convinced in every particular 
by Cogliano’s argument, I cannot stress enough how 
worthwhile I found Emperor of Liberty to be. This is a highly 
readable and highly valuable reconsideration of Thomas 
Jefferson and his foreign policy that forces its readers to 
approach with fresh eyes and a new understanding the 
statecraft of our third president.
The Lowest of the Diplomatic Tribe: Idealism, Realism, 
and the Perils of Presentism
Francis D. Cogliano
I would like to thank Andrew Johns and Jay Sexton for this opportunity to discuss Empire of Liberty. I am very grateful to Robert J. Allison, Shannon E. Duffy, 
Eliga H. Gould, and Jeffrey J. Malanson for their careful 
and generous reading of my book. By way of a response, 
I would like to reflect on how I came to write the book 
while addressing some of the specific matters raised by the 
reviewers. 
I was gratified that Robert Allison was invited to 
comment on my book. Allison’s Crescent Obscured remains 
the definitive work on the early relations between the 
United States and the Islamic world.1  I profited greatly from 
his work in writing my own chapters on Jefferson’s attempts 
to solve the Barbary “problem.” He is correct that my study 
devotes greater attention—two out of seven chapters—to 
U.S.-Barbary relations and the First 
Barbary War (1801–5) than previous 
studies of Jefferson’s statecraft. To 
some extent the focus on that conflict 
places Emperor of Liberty in context. As 
I write this, and as I was writing those 
chapters, the United States is waging 
war in the Islamic world. As with the 
First Barbary War, the conflict (thus 
far confined to airstrikes in Syria and 
northern Iraq) has raised questions 
over whether the president or Congress 
has the ultimate authority to wage war 
and whether the United States should 
commit ground forces to the conflict. 
These, of course, have been 
recurrent themes in American 
foreign policy since 2001. As I noted 
in Emperor of Liberty, a spate of books 
on the Barbary wars have appeared (or been republished) 
since 2001. Several of these seem to have been written and 
published with the “War on Terror” in mind and present the 
First Barbary War as the “First War on Terror.” This type of 
presentism does little to help us understand contemporary 
conflicts and distorts our understanding of the past. We 
need to be aware of the context in which a particular book 
appears but, armed with that awareness, wary of allowing 
present-day concerns to distort our understanding of the 
past.
While one must avoid the perils of presentism, I believe 
Emperor of Liberty is, like all works of scholarship, a book 
of its time. As a scholar of the United States living outside 
of the United States, I have, for more than twenty years—a 
period that began when Francis Fukuyama anticipated the 
“end of history” and that includes the 9/11 attacks and their 
prolonged and bloody aftermath—witnessed the degree to 
which American foreign policy shapes the world beyond 
the United States. Meanwhile, the core constitutional and 
political questions arising from the policy decisions of the 
George W. Bush and Obama administrations—particularly 
concerning executive authority in making foreign policy 
and deploying force—couldn’t help but inform the 
questions I asked when studying Jefferson’s approach to 
statecraft. 
Put another way, I devote much more attention to 
the Barbary War than Robert W. Tucker and David C. 
Cogliano rejects this assessment, as 
“this interpretation assumed that 
Jefferson had a range of options 
available to him but was blinded 
by his idealism or moralism. On the 
contrary, Jefferson had relatively few 
options available to him. He chose 
economic coercion, preparatory to 
war, as, he believed, the least bad of 
these” (240). In this isolated instance, 
Jefferson did not have many options 
open to him, but that was because he 
had severely limited his options by 
having rejected the Monroe-Pinkney 
treaty earlier that year.
 Passport January 2015 Page 15
Hendrickson do in their fine study of Jefferson’s statecraft, 
as Robert Allison notes in his comments.2 Writing, as they 
did, when the Cold War was coming to an end, Tucker and 
Hendrickson focused on the place of the United States in 
great power diplomacy and dismissed the Barbary War as 
the equivalent of a “police action” from the latter part of 
the twentieth century. By contrast, Jefferson’s policy toward 
North Africa takes on different cast when a book is being 
written, as mine was, in an era of persistent (and seemingly 
permanent) American “small wars” in the Islamic world. 
This is not to say that Emperor of Liberty is “about” the “War 
on Terror” and its aftermath any more than Tucker and 
Hendrickson’s book is “about” the Cold War. Rather, one 
must appreciate the context in which a work of scholarship 
appears. Emperor of Liberty seeks to examine the origins, 
development, and implementation of Jefferson’s statecraft. 
It does so informed by a rich historiography. My hope is 
that the major themes the book addresses will transcend 
the current moment even as that moment informs some of 
the questions that I sought to address.
Jefferson has often been portrayed as a misguided 
idealist who failed to understand the diplomacy and 
statecraft of the great European powers and pursued an 
unrealistic foreign policy that resulted in the War of 1812, 
which was nearly catastrophic for the new American 
republic. This is certainly one of the themes of Tucker and 
Hendrickson’s Empire of Liberty. 
Eliga Gould interprets my critique 
of Tucker and Hendrickson as 
suggesting that Jefferson’s foreign 
policy was “non-ideological.” I 
think that interpretation overstates 
the case somewhat. While I don’t 
feel that ideology was as important 
a driver of Jefferson’s foreign 
policy as Tucker and Hendrickson 
do, I do believe it was important 
to Jefferson. My main argument in 
Emperor of Liberty is that “although 
Jefferson was guided by a clear 
ideological vision for the American 
republic, he was pragmatic about 
the means he employed to protect 
the republic and advance its 
strategic interests” (10). His ends 
may have been ideological, but his means were pragmatic. 
My view is that Jefferson was neither an idealist nor a 
realist in his pursuit of foreign policy. Moreover, I believe 
that the idealist/realist dichotomy, which is a product 
of the historiographical debates over American foreign 
policy during the twentieth century, is not appropriate for 
describing foreign policy during the early republic. 
Jeffrey Malanson addresses Jefferson’s idealism in 
his review. He argues that “Jefferson’s contention that the 
United States should not have to play by the same rules 
as Europe in dealing with the Barbary states contains a 
stronger idealist streak than Cogliano would allow.” I’m 
not sure that there is all that much between my view and 
Malanson’s on this issue. In chapter 2 I discuss the debate 
between Jefferson and John Adams over the Barbary 
question during the 1780s, when they were both diplomats 
in Europe. I stress that Adams pursued a more pragmatic 
approach, arguing that the United States should pay tribute 
to the North Africans; while Jefferson took the position, 
which he believed was grounded in principle, that the 
United States should lead a coalition of lesser naval powers 
and wage war against the Barbary states. 
Later in his review Malanson writes that he continues 
to believe “that idealism played a larger role in determining 
Jefferson’s foreign policy than Cogliano contends.” He 
cites my treatment of the negotiations over the Monroe-
Pinkney Treaty and the subsequent embargo. My view 
is that Jefferson decided not to submit the treaty to the 
senate for consideration because it failed to address the 
issue of impressment, arguably the most important point 
of contention in British-American relations. I argue that 
Jefferson’s response to the treaty was grounded in realism 
in the sense that he appraised the situation, judged the 
treaty to be politically unacceptable, and sought to prolong 
the negotiations in the hope that Britain might relent on the 
impressment question. As Secretary of State James Madison 
wrote of the situation, “As long as the negotiation can be 
honorably protracted, it is a resource to be preferred, under 
existing circumstances, to the peremptory alternative of 
improper concessions or inevitable collisions” (quoted on p. 
227). I don’t agree with Malanson that Jefferson’s rejection 
of the treaty arose from an “inability to realistically 
assess America’s weight in the world.” Rather, he rejected 
the treaty because he made an accurate assessment of 
America’s relative weakness vis-à-vis Britain. As with the 
later embargo, I think Jefferson opted for the least bad of 
the limited options available to him. 
Writing of Jefferson’s approach to the Barbary states, 
Malanson states that “it is an example that suggests how 
messy these assessments of idealism versus realism 
actually are.” I am in complete agreement with him here. 
Where Jefferson is concerned, the realist/idealist dichotomy 
obscures as much as it reveals and doesn’t really help us to 
understand Jefferson’s actions. I believe 
Jefferson was guided by an idealistic 
vision for both the United States and 
international relations, but his tenure 
as a diplomat exposed him to the 
realities of power politics and the limits 
of American influence. As president, 
Jefferson grounded his policies in an 
awareness of American weakness. I 
think he understood just how weak the 
United States was in geopolitical terms. 
His tenure as a diplomat in Europe 
provided almost daily reminders of 
American inconsequence. As he wrote 
to James Monroe in 1784, “we are the 
lowest and most obscure of the whole 
diplomatic tribe” at Versailles.3 This is 
perhaps the most important issue over 
which Malanson and I disagree, rather 
than where we place Jefferson on some imagined realist-
idealist spectrum.
Shannon E. Duffy seems more comfortable than Jeffrey 
Malanson with my argument that Jefferson’s actions 
were pragmatic and that he interpreted events from an 
ideological perspective. She writes that “Jefferson’s day-
to-day actions might have been motivated by practical 
considerations, but his fundamental understandings of the 
problems that confronted him, throughout his life, seemed 
to be based mainly in his ideological and abstract ideals.” 
In this I think Duffy and I agree. She argues, however, that 
Jefferson’s idealism was frequently based on erroneous 
assumptions that led him astray in foreign relations. She 
attributes his failures to actions taken “because his basic 
assessment of the situation, which was derived from his 
tendency to arrive at premises beforehand, was in error,” 
and she cites his mixed success in North Africa and the 
failure of the embargo. 
Yet Jefferson felt vindicated by the Tripoli Treaty that 
brought the Barbary War to an end. While the United States 
committed to a one-off payment of $60,000 to release the 
crew of the U.S.S. Philadelphia, it did not commit to annual 
tribute payments, which was the point of principle over 
which Jefferson had waged the war. Nonetheless, the 
Barbary War was expensive—so expensive that one might 
argue that it vindicated John Adams’s 1786 view that the 
United States would have been better off paying tribute 
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than waging war. Jefferson, by contrast, felt that paying 
tribute would be more costly in the long-run. In addition to 
the annual payments, new, more expensive treaties would 
have to be negotiated periodically with all four Barbary 
states. 
Although I feel that Jefferson may have had a surer 
understanding of the international situation than Duffy 
does, I agree with her that Jefferson could be callous and 
indifferent to the suffering of others. Violence, as Duffy 
notes astutely, often seemed like “an abstract concept 
to him.” Perhaps that shouldn’t surprise us. During the 
course of his long life Jefferson held approximately 600 
persons in bondage—including his own children. His 
assumptions about the efficacy and the consequences of the 
embargo were faulty, and his leadership therefore seriously 
deficient, in part because he was indifferent to the suffering 
the embargo caused and didn’t appreciate its extent. It was, 
as I argue in the book, a failure and his greatest mistake as 
president, and it seems to me to be the strongest evidence 
for Duffy’s assertion that Jefferson made bad policy based 
on faulty premises. I don’t think that he did so quite as 
frequently as she does, however.4 
Eliga Gould raises an important question regarding the 
relationship between idealism and realism. He writes that 
sometimes “ideals serve as rhetorical screens and weapons 
to justify policies that may or may not have an ideological 
origin. If we think of moral principles in this way, it seems 
to me that there were times when Jefferson did play the role 
of the idealist, albeit in ways that were both calculating and 
nationally self-interested.” Perhaps the best example of such 
behavior is Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana Territory. 
While it was undoubtedly in the strategic and economic 
self-interest of the United States, Jefferson sought to justify 
it in ideological terms. He did so in part, I believe, because 
he was uncertain about its constitutionality. He toyed 
with drafting a constitutional amendment to sanction the 
purchase during the summer of 1803 but gave up the idea 
when it became clear that delay might lead to the collapse 
of the deal. At the end of the year he authorized U.S. and 
state troops to attack the Spanish should they attempt to 
prevent the transfer of Louisiana from France to the United 
States. 
After the formal acquisition of Louisiana, Jefferson 
played the primary role in drawing up the Breckinridge 
Bill, which vested considerable power in the unelected, 
presidentially appointed governor of the Territory of 
Orleans (the most populous part of the purchase territory). 
Despite the apparent “realism” underlying these actions, 
Jefferson saw the purchase as a triumph of republicanism 
and justified it as such. His efforts perfectly illustrate 
Gould’s apposite observation calling into question the 
(largely imagined) distinction that some historians draw 
between realism and idealism.
Curiously, none of my reviewers considers the 
Louisiana Purchase in detail. That omission might have 
surprised Jefferson and his contemporaries, who regarded 
the acquisition of Louisiana as one of the most important 
achievements of his presidency. It surprises me, because 
the Louisiana Purchase sits at the nexus between idealism 
and realism, which is such an important theme for my 
reviewers. I think Eliga Gould offers a timely reminder that, 
ultimately, it is impossible to categorize Jefferson’s motives 
and actions as strictly “idealistic” or “realistic.” Jefferson’s 
foreign policy fused elements of idealism and pragmatism 
with mixed results. I argue that those results were as much 
the product of factors beyond Jefferson’s control, such as 
luck and the relative weakness of United States, as his 
actions. The relative neglect of the Louisiana Purchase in 
this forum (and the consequent emphasis on the Barbary 
War) suggests that each generation can and should ask new 
questions of Jefferson and his time.
 I am very grateful to my colleagues for their thoughtful 
comments and observations on my book. They have given 
me much to ponder and have elevated our conversation 
on matters of war, peace, and statecraft with intelligence 
and generosity. Indeed, one might characterize their 
contributions as Jeffersonian in the best sense of the word.
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